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By David Hearne, Researcher at the Centre for Brexit Studies 
Recent news has emerged that the Metropolitan Police have advised 
retailers to consider hiring extra security personnel in the event of a 
“no-deal” Brexit[1]. The alleged reasoning behind this is that, in the 
event of consumer fears over shortages, customer numbers may 
increase as individuals attempt to secure access to preferred foods 
leading to crowd control problems. Ironically the concern is that, 
irrespective of whether such shortages do indeed occur, public 
perceptions and anxiety are likely to drive demand and stoke panic. 
The UK (specifically England and Wales) is one of the countries with 
the fewest police officers per capita in the EU[2], with cutbacks 
overseen by Theresa May in her role as Home Secretary. There is a 
therefore natural desire on the part of the police, at a time when 
budgets are particularly stretched, to want to ensure that resources do 
not need to be dedicated to low-level incidents around crowd control 
and opportunistic petty theft attempts. In such an environment, such 
advice perhaps seems prudent. After all, leaving the EU is almost 
certain to entail economic costs[3-6] and no-deal is likely to render 
many issues acute[7, 8] (particularly for industries such as 
automotive[9-11]). As such, contingency planning is urgently 
needed[12]. 
Nevertheless, like most such dire pronouncements they are likely to 
harm rather than help. Consider, for a moment, some of the retailers 
most likely to be vexed: supermarkets. Looking around my local 
supermarket, a very large proportion of the non-food goods in 
question come from outside the EU. Electronic goods, whether 
microwaves, televisions or others, predominantly originate from East 
Asia. In some cases they may enter the UK via the Rotterdam-Calais-
Dover link, but this is unlikely to lead to riot-inducing shortages of flat-
screen TVs (after all, it should be straightforward to reroute such 
produce to avoid the Dover-Calais link). The same is true for clothing 
and utensils (only a small minority of which originates in the EU). 
Food is likely to pose more of a problem. Although the UK grows 
some 60% of its own food, there is a distinct seasonal pattern to 
navigate. Food and drink that is not time-sensitive (anything that is 
long-dated) will be all-but unaffected. After all, it is quite feasible to 
send canned or frozen food “the long way around” – it might just take 
slightly longer to get here and be more expensive when it arrives. 
Providing retailers plan appropriately for longer shipping times, there 
is no good reason why French wine, German beer or Italian prosecco 
should be off the menu. 
Fresh food grown in the UK over the critical spring and summer 
months should be fine, provided there is sufficient labour to pick it. 
There should, therefore, be adequate access to strawberries, for 
example. Some foods are shipped from further afield: during the 
winter months blueberries are typically shipped from Peru. Bananas 
are also imported from outside of Europe. The small minority of 
foodstuffs shipped by air should also be entirely unaffected. 
In other words, the real challenge will be quite narrowly focussed and 
will lie in those areas where food is perishable and is grown and/or 
manufactured in other countries in Europe during the summer months. 
Examples include lettuce, mince, bacon, some cheese and butter 
products and ready-meals containing them. No doubt these are 
staples and their loss would be keenly felt. Nevertheless, the UK does 
produce a substantial quantity of many of these products: UK 
production of beef is around 50% of all consumption, although it 
should be noted that a substantial proportion of this production is of 
cuts of meat (such as offal) that are not habitually consumed in large 
quantities in the UK. As such, there might be less product available 
but supply would be far from zero. 
Moreover, alternative shipping routes are available for many products. 
Only in the most extreme cases are shipping times so time-critical that 
a delay of several hours would result in the perishing of the goods in 
question. As a result, in most cases, an alternative ferry route might 
be feasible if needed. Moreover, in several cases alternative sources 
of supply are available in extremis (notably Australia and New 
Zealand in the case of meats – although this would require a 
reduction in tariffs to make them competitive). Some fish products 
might also be affected by no deal (although staples such as salmon or 
cod are largely farmed in Scotland or imported via routes other than 
the critical Dover-Calais link). 
This leaves only a small number of agricultural goods. Ironically, 
lettuce is a prominent example of these implying that, contra Dominic 
Raab, one of the few foods that might be genuinely threatened in the 
event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit is the BLT sandwich. However, just as the 
great courgette shortage of 2016[13] did not lead to riots, it is similarly 
unlikely that the great lettuce shortage of 2019 will. 
None of this is to suggest that no-deal will be anything other than 
economically damaging. Nor does it preclude supply-chain disruptions 
and wider problems. Moreover, the challenges are not just short-term: 
UK hauliers face the problem of their Community License becoming 
invalid at the end of 2019 and the stay of execution offered by the 
European Commission and the European Aviation Safety Agency 
around aviation and safety licenses will likewise last for just 9 months. 
Exporters in many industries (including many service-sector 
industries) will face sudden and substantial new barriers, tariffs will 
suddenly apply and parts of the agricultural sector face potentially 
devastating changes. Nevertheless, scaremongering over shortages 
and a near-complete end to cross-channel traffic is unhelpful and wide 
of the mark. 
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